Introduction
CS was a patient liable to be detained on leave of absence from hospital (leave).
2 She challenged the decision of the Tribunal which had confirmed the lawfulness of her detention following renewal 3 on the grounds that she was no longer receiving hospital treatment which justified continued detention. The court, whilst restating that hospital treatment must be "a significant component" of the treatment plan to be lawful under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the Act), found that, although the Responsible Medical Officer's (RMO) grasp on the patient was "gossamer thin", it was a "significant component" sufficient to justify continuing detention. As a patient liable to be detained, CS could be recalled to hospital for treatment if she refused or failed to take her medication in the community which introduced an element of compulsion that she accept treatment in the community. Her treatment in hospital comprised attending ward rounds at the hospital once every 4 weeks. These were described by her RMO as an opportunity to discuss how leave was progressing, to discuss her medication and how it was suiting her and to provide her with supportive and motivational work to help her move from a hospital-based model of care to community-based care with the assertive outreach team. The latter included support for compliance with medication as part of treatment. Further leave was negotiated at each ward round. Additionally, CS had weekly sessions with the ward psychologist. Her hospital-based care was also described by Counsel on behalf of the detaining authority, as the continued provision of a place of refuge and stability, a reference point for CS in her attempts to disengage with treatment in hospital and engage with treatment in the community. By the time the court considered her case in December 2004, CS had been discharged from detention and her care was continuing in the community without compulsion. CS challenged the decision of the Tribunal that she should remain liable to detention and recall (rather than directly challenging the detaining hospital following renewal), claiming its decision was disproportionate and in breach of her human rights under Article 5 ECHR, her right to liberty, as her treatment plan indicated that she was not receiving any hospital treatment. Broken down, she argued that the Tribunal failed to properly exercise its powers by: a) failing to order her immediate discharge, or b) even if it accepted the need for further phasing of her discharge incorporating a continuing element of liability to detention, by failing to name a day on which discharge should take effect, or c) failing to consider less restrictive (and more proportionate) options including the use of guardianship under section 7 of the Act or supervised discharge pursuant to section 25 (A-J).
The Facts
Joining in East London and the City Mental Health NHS trust as an interested party, CS initially argued that the decision to renew her detention by her RMO was also unlawful because the RMO was not seeking her actual admission to hospital, but in the course of the proceedings Counsel for CS conceded that treatment in a hospital under section 3 can take place daily without overnight stays in hospital.
The Law
(1) Section 17 leave
Section 17 provides the only lawful authority for a detained patient to be absent from the detaining hospital. 5 A person on leave remains liable to be detained and subject to consent to treatment under Part IV of the Act. (2) Duration of detention A person cannot be recalled to hospital once he has ceased to be liable to be detained. 10 It is unlawful for a patient to be recalled to hospital to facilitate renewal of detention under section 20 of the Act.
11 It will, however, be lawful if the treatment plan contains an element of hospital treatment.
12 This finding marked a departure from the position that had stood since Hallstrom 13 that a patient on leave could not have his detention renewed. Developing this theme in R (on the application of DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust, the lawfulness of continued detention was held to depend on ". . . whether a significant component of the plan for the claimant was for treatment in hospital. It is worth noting that, by section 145(1) of the Act, the words 'medical treatment' include rehabilitation under medical supervision. There is no doubt, therefore, that the proposed leave of absence for the claimant is properly regarded as part of her treatment plan. As para 20.1 of the Code of Practice states, 'leave of absence can be an important part of a patient's treatment plan'. Its purpose was to preserve the claimant's links with the community; to reduce the stress caused by hospital surroundings which she found particularly uncongenial; and to build a platform of trust between her and the clinicians upon which dialogue might be constructed and insight on her part into her illness engendered."
14
In setting boundaries to the limits of "hospital treatment" the discharge by an MHRT of detention of a person on leave to a nursing home where it was acknowledged that hospital treatment would arise at some point in the future, but its timing was uncertain, has been held to be lawful.
(3) The Powers of the Tribunal
Section 72(1) and (2) require the Tribunal to direct the discharge of a patient detained under section 3 if it is not satisfied that "he is then suffering from mental illness . . . of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; or that it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient . . . that he should receive such treatment 16 having regard (a) to the likelihood of medical treatment alleviating or preventing a deterioration of the patient's condition; and (b) in the case of a patient suffering from mental illness . . . to the likelihood of the patient, if discharged, being able to care for himself, to obtain the care he needs or to guard himself against serious exploitation."
17

The Argument
The court was invited by Kristina Stern, Counsel representing both the MHRT and the Trust, to consider CS's treatment holistically, incorporating in-patient, out-patient and community treatment, subject to constant assessment of each element. 
The Decision
Pitchford J accepted that the test for continuing liability for detention was whether a significant component of the plan was for the patient to receive medical treatment in a hospital. 20 Finding the contention on behalf of CS that what was happening was merely a method of enforcing co-operation with the Outreach Team to be too crude an analysis, Pitchford J supported the difficult role of the RMO in managing a patient back into the community in a manner designed to avoid the revolving door syndrome:
"Viewed as a whole the course of treatment should be seen..... as a continuing responsive programme, during which the need for treatment in hospital and on leave was being constantly reassessed depending upon the circumstances, including CS's responses to AOT and the ward round. Until such time as the transition was complete, the element of treatment at hospital remained a significant part of the whole.
21
It is clear to me that the RMO was engaged in a delicate balancing exercise by which she was, with as light a touch as she could, encouraging progress to discharge. Her purpose was to break the persistent historical cycle of admission, serious relapse and readmission. It may be that in the closing stages of the treatment in hospital her grasp on the claimant was gossamer thin, but to view that grasp as insignificant is, in my view, to misunderstand the evidence."
22
Each of the challenges against the Tribunal were dismissed. On failing to order her immediate discharge, Pitchford J accepted the evidence of the RMO that : "It is not appropriate to abruptly discharge a patient who has been subject to compulsory admission and treatment as an in-patient for a number of months. I would strongly disagree with an assertion that it is better for a patient to be discharged straight into the community without adequate phasing of care and then re-sectioned if the patient suffers a relapse. Such a statement shows little insight into modern means of engaging and treating patients with severe mental illness... To allow CS's section to lapse or bring it to an abrupt end only to re-section her would greatly upset CS and damage the relationship between her and the clinical team. It would also mean that mental health services were only able to engage once CS has suffered a significant deterioration. On failing to name a day on which discharge should take effect, Pitchford J again found in favour of the medical evidence:
"That course could, as Miss Stern pointed out, have been disastrous. The RMO was not in a position to know from one day to the next what CS's prospects in the community could ultimately be. Only upon the successful completion of the carefully laid plan of treatment could discharge be risked". 24 Finally, on failing to consider less restrictive (and more proportionate) options, Pitchford J accepted the medical evidence that CS's personality would not be amenable to supervised discharge as it was unlikely she would remain compliant with treatment. Whilst the Tribunal was not asked to consider guardianship, Pitchford J was in no doubt that guardianship was not appropriate. The new regime would have brought with it significant upheaval for CS, including a whole new group of professionals. Arguably more relevant to practice, Pitchford J agreed with Kristina Stern that "there was no power available under either regime to require the patient to take medication". He further commented that "CS's knowledge of the RMO's powers was a significant element in her willingness to accept the treatment plan."
25
The Court found that the Tribunal members had also addressed the issue of proportionality stating in their written decision that they had "taken into account R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal North and East London Region [2001] 26 and from the evidence are satisfied that detention is a proportionate response having regard to the risks on discharge."
On the issue whether a decision to continue detention under section 72 (1) required a proportionate response under Article 5(1)(e) ECHR, Pitchford J applied the Court of Appeal's judgment in
Nadarajah v Secretary of State for the Home Department
27
: A challenge to the proportionality of the Tribunal's exercise of its powers in CS's case would not have been made out in any event:
"the question is whether or not domestic law permits the arbitrary detention of those in the position of the claimant. It seems to me that manifestly it does not. Accordingly, there is no dimension further to s 72 of the 1983 Act which needs to be added to the statutory right to discharge and the exercise of the residual discretion. The application of the principle of proportionality to this case leads in any event, in my view, to only one conclusion: the interference with the claimant's freedom of movement and choice were minimal in the context of the object to be achieved, namely her satisfactory return to community care. 36 Whilst adopting the test in DR, a more holistic view was taken by the court when considering treatment and rehabilitation of CS, by reference to the continuing and responsive programme. The emphasis or weight given to hospital treatment as a "significant component" 37 of treatment becomes more intangible when the whole of the programme is viewed in this way. How is one element of an holistic plan more significant than another? It is no doubt true, as this case shows, the exploration of the definitions of "hospital," "medical treatment," "in-patient" in the context particularly of leave is evidence of the complexity of current law.
38
A further conclusion to be drawn is that, whilst admission to hospital (and a bed) for treatment surely remains a necessary pre-requisite to initial detention and application of the compulsory treatment provisions of Part IV of the Act 39 , it is no longer necessary when judging the lawfulness of renewal of detention. In this sense a different test is developing which requires only a connection between hospital and treatment. That connection can be "gossamer thin" so long as it can be shown to be a significant component of treatment. Logically, if different tests are being applied on admission compared with renewal, can this be justified in the context of an individual's human rights? Have the courts gone too far in keeping pace with clinical practice and exposed an inherent weaknesses in their decisions by discarding the requirement for in-patient treatment for renewal of detention required in Hallstrom and Barker? Only time will tell.
(b) The future for guardianship and supervised discharge?
This question is posed in the context of the obiter views in CS 40 and in DR. 41 Both claimants failed in their arguments that a less restrictive regime than remaining "liable to be detained" should have been considered. In CS the RMO felt that her patient would not benefit from supervised discharge because she would find it difficult to comply given her personality. The judge agreed.
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Guardianship was also dismissed. 
